I. INTRODUCTION

URBAN POVERTY IS much influenced by what city or municipal governments do – or do not do; also by what they can or cannot do. This is often forgotten – as discussions of poverty and the best means to reduce poverty tend to concentrate on the role of national government and international agencies. One reason why the role of local government has been given so little attention has been the tendency to view (and measure) poverty only in terms of inadequate income or consumption. As an understanding of poverty widens – for instance to include poor quality and/or insecure housing, inadequate services (water, sanitation, health care, access to education) and lack of civil and political rights – so does the greater current or potential role of local government to contribute to poverty reduction. The potential contribution of local government to poverty reduction is further enhanced, as protection from discrimination and from economic shocks, disasters, crime and violence are also recognized as part of poverty reduction.

Although the range of responsibilities allocated to urban governments differs from nation to nation, in virtually all it includes many functions that have an important bearing on most aspects of deprivation. But it is clear that in most urban centres, local governments fail to meet many of their responsibilities to large sections of the population within their jurisdiction. This failure has led to a new interest in the political economy of urban areas, which influences the scale and nature of poverty through, for instance, the influence on who gets jobs, resources (including land for housing), infrastructure and services in each city, and who does not. It is increasingly recognised that the process of governance extends well beyond the institution of government (be it local or national). For the purposes of poverty reduction programmes, this recognition has resulted in a new interest in both the role of the rich and the powerful, and the role of the organizations of civil society, especially those that claim to act for the poor. It is evident that many such institutions, be they state agencies or independent groups, may have as significant a role in exacerbating poverty as they do in reducing it.

This issue of Environment and Urbanization has 11 papers that examine the links between poverty and governance in particular cities and one that examines this link for a particular low-income settlement – El Mezquital in Guatemala City (see Table 1). Nine of these papers are drawn from a collaborative research programme.* The cities examined include those from among the highest income countries in the South (Chile) and the lowest income countries (Mali and Mozambique). They include several cities that have been among the most successful in their nations in terms of economic growth (Cebu, Visakhapatnam, Bangalore and Santiago) and those that have not (Mombasa and Kumasi). They include several cities that seek to position themselves as major cities within their wider region in terms of foreign investment – Santiago, Cebu, Johannesburg and Bangalore. The cities cover a great range in terms of the access of their low-income populations to basic infrastructure and services.

Among the interesting points of commonality or contrast among the 12 cities are:
- A great range of political structures, with some having governments that are clearly more accountable and responsive to urban poor groups than others;

* Nine of the papers in this issue come from a research programme on Urban Governance, Partnerships and Poverty, funded by the UK Department for International Development’s ESCOR programme. This involves research teams in each of these cities and a coalition of UK-based research groups from the University of Birmingham, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), the University of Wales, Cardiff, and the London School of Economics (LSE). For more details of this research (including details of its publications and its free newsletter), write to Ursula Grant, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK; e-mail: u.grant@bham.ac.uk.
II. THE MAIN AREAS OF INFLUENCE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN REDUCING POVERTY

THE INTENTION OF this editorial is not to compare the cities but to draw out of the papers the main issues in regard to the current and potential role of urban government in poverty reduction – and the influence of “governance” on this. There are at least six areas where local governments have a particularly important role that are discussed below.

a. Access to land for housing

Most urban governments have a strong influence on who can obtain land for housing – both through what they do and do not do. The ways in which they allocate land they own or control, define land uses and implement the zoning and planning controls, or regulations linked to these, within urban plans influence whether (and where) low-income households can legally acquire land on which to build their homes. Their attitudes to informal settlements and to the “extra-legal” ways in which low-income groups can acquire land (ranging from support for upgrading and legalization, to tolerance, to opposition and eviction) are equally powerful.

Not surprisingly, in all cities middle and upper-income groups and powerful economic interests benefit most from government policies, but there is a considerable range among cities in the possibilities for low-income groups to get land, build their own homes and develop their own livelihoods. This is not so much a matter of what government agencies do as what they permit. For instance, in Maputo, Kumasi and Bamako, while local government delivers little for low-income groups, at least many low-income groups can find

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Table 1: The Cities Covered in Papers in this Issue of Environment and Urbanization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Political Status and Population</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmedabad (India)</td>
<td>State capital; 2.9 million inhabitants in the city, 3.3 million in the urban agglomeration (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamako (Mali)</td>
<td>National capital; more than a million inhabitants by 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangalore (India)</td>
<td>State capital; c. 6 million inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cebu (Philippines)</td>
<td>Provincial capital and industrial centre; 662,299 inhabitants (1995) and 1.44 million in metropolitan area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombo (Sri Lanka)</td>
<td>National capital; c. 666,000 in city with more than 4.6 million in the metropolitan region by the mid 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala City (Guatemala)</td>
<td>National capital; c. 830,000 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg (South Africa)</td>
<td>Commercial and industrial heartland of South Africa; 3.8 million inhabitants in Greater Johannesburg in 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumasi (Ghana)</td>
<td>Regional capital; c. 800,000 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo (Mozambique)</td>
<td>National capital; c. 1.3 million inhabitants in 1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mombasa (Kenya)</td>
<td>Kenya’s main port and second largest city; c. 700,000 inhabitants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago (Chile)</td>
<td>National capital; 4.7 million inhabitants in 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visakhapatnam (India)</td>
<td>Port and industrial centre; 1.1 million inhabitants in 1991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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• The very limited powers, resources and capacities to raise revenues available to urban governments in most instances. One particular issue within this is the extent to which higher levels of government control resources and decisions about investments;
• The complex political economy within all cities which influences who gets land for housing, infrastructure and services; and
• The capacity of anti-poor local government policies and practices to harm the livelihoods of many low-income groups within their jurisdiction.
land for housing, usually “outside of government,” although in Maputo and Bamako higher income groups get the best land.

The papers on Bamako, Kumasi and Maputo highlight the importance of traditional or extra-legal land acquisition systems for allowing low-income households to obtain land for housing. These are not ideal systems, and they do not necessarily serve all low-income groups (for instance, in Kumasi, non-natives have more difficulties getting land this way). They can also constrain people who need to move, as it is difficult to sell the land or house and get another plot in the location to which they want to move. These systems often produce settlement patterns that are poorly coordinated with existing infrastructure systems, which limits the potential provision of infrastructure and services. These systems also tend to commercialize as city economies develop – as described in the papers on Kumasi and Bamako and also in previous papers in Environment and Urbanization. And as the papers on Bamako and Maputo discuss, it is usually wealthier or well-connected households who end up as the beneficiaries of government programmes to allocate new land sites for housing.

Other papers emphasize the difficulties facing urban governments of larger and more prosperous cities in ensuring access to land for poorer groups. For instance, in Johannesburg, rising land prices and the opposition of middle and upper-income groups have limited the government’s capacity to increase land availability for poorer groups in central areas.

It is worth recalling the link between access to housing and livelihoods. The ease with which low-income groups can obtain housing, and the price paid, has considerable importance for livelihoods. This is not only in the proportion of household income that has to be spent on housing, but also in the extent to which the house’s location provides ready access to income-earning opportunities, or serves itself as space for income earning opportunities (as described in the paper in Feedback by Peter Kellett and Graham Tipple) or has rooms that can be rented out.

b. The provision of basic infrastructure and services

All city or municipal governments have responsibility for ensuring the provision of some infrastructure and services – although with great variation in the extent to which they have sole responsibility, shared responsibility with higher levels of government or a supervisory and regulatory role for private sector or NGO providers. Whichever is the case, they have a major influence on the extent to which low-income households can obtain basic services that are critical for health and education. There are obvious links with access to land; agencies responsible for different forms of infrastructure or service provision may be reluctant to serve those living on illegally occupied or subdivided land or land acquired through traditional means, or may not be permitted to do so. There are also particular difficulties in providing infrastructure and services to many informal settlements – for instance to the many that have developed on steep slopes or flood plains or have unclear plot boundaries.

The critical role of basic services in reducing poverty is often forgotten or dismissed because it is seen to be only alleviating poverty. But government (and other external) agencies can greatly underestimate the scale of the health burden suffered by low-income groups and the extent to which basic infrastructure and services can reduce this. Much illness, injury and premature death can be avoided through good quality housing with adequate provision for water and sanitation. The impact of illnesses and injuries can also be much reduced through good quality, readily available health care and emergency services. The paper by Philip Amis and Shashi Kumar on Visakhapatnam emphasizes the importance of infrastructure and service provision for poverty reduction – and illustrates the critical links between illness that leads to debt and then impoverishment. It also describes how poor health among low-income workers limits their capacity to increase their incomes by working longer hours. This is one among several papers that describes upgrading programmes, and it reports on how much the upgrading programme (which reached 200,000 people) was appreciated by surveyed households – for (among other things) reducing flooding, making roads passable, and reducing the burden of collecting water.

Several papers highlight the inadequacies in provision for basic services, even in some of the most economically successful cities, such as Cebu and Bangalore, or among urban populations that are officially registered as having access to water and sanitation. For instance:

- In Kumasi, most of the population have inadequate provision for water and sanitation, including 40 percent who have to rely on 400 poorly
maintained public latrines for which long queues are common, while 8 percent have no sanitation facility and defecate outside.

- In Ahmedabad, in 1991, most residents in “slum areas” had a shared water supply, 18 per cent had no access to piped water and 28 per cent had no toilet facilities. An estimated half a million people rely on defecation in the open.
- In Bangalore, estimates suggest that more than half the population depend on public fountains – many of which supply contaminated water because of poor maintenance and broken pipes. More than 100,000 households have no toilet facilities.
- In Cebu, a high proportion of low-income households have no toilet and so have no alternative but to defecate in the open or “wrap and throw”.

Several papers also describe the poor quality of the water within piped water systems or the irregularity of supply. For instance in Mombasa, water is only available for an average of 2.9 hours a day for households connected to piped supplies, and many households have had no water through their pipes for several years. These reports are among a growing number that suggest that official statistics on water and sanitation in urban areas greatly over-state the extent and adequacy of provision.

Other papers emphasize the importance of improved service provision. In Johannesburg, for instance, one of the city authority’s main fiscal commitments to poverty reduction has been to improve provision for infrastructure and services to those areas denied such provision under the previous apartheid government. Mariken Vaa’s paper on Bamako emphasizes the importance for lower-income groups of the change in government policy during the 1990s towards legalization of illegal settlements and upgrading, despite the programme’s limitations. Shyam Dutta’s paper on Ahmedabad describes the pilot slum networking project which initially involved a partnership between the municipal authorities, Arvind Mills (one of the city’s largest enterprises), community-based organizations and local NGOs. The paper also describes the difficulties faced by the different partners (that led to the withdrawal of Arvind Mills) and the municipal authorities’ hope that the programme can be expanded to reach all “slums” by 2003. The paper by Felisa Etemadi on Cebu points to great range of partnerships established among municipal government agencies, local NGOs and people’s organizations to provide social services, and describes how these have improved provision, especially for primary health care, communal water and sanitation facilities and the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases. As the paper points out, the urban poor are more able to send their children to school, improve their dwellings and obtain loans to acquire land for housing.

c. Serving and supporting a prosperous economy

This includes at least three aspects:
- The capacity of city or municipal government to help attract new investments and support the expansion of existing enterprises;
- The capacity to increase local revenues, which then allows more investment in infrastructure and services, including that which benefits urban poor groups; and
- The capacity to support the prosperity of the economies through which most low-income groups obtain their livelihoods.

The provision of infrastructure and services to unserved areas not only benefits those living there but also those working there. Solomon Benjamin’s paper on Bangalore shows the possible conflicts between attracting external investments and supporting local, less formal economies. It also describes the complexity and diversity of Bangalore’s various “local economies” and their multiple connections to other towns and villages. These may appear chaotic and unplanned to governments yet they provide the livelihoods for most poor groups, cheapen the costs for the development of new enterprises and allow poorer groups to find new livelihood niches. The paper also shows how, within these local economies, political processes develop that are inclusive for many low-income groups – but how these local economies receive little public support, as most government funds and land allocations go to serve the corporate sector.

The papers on Cebu and Ahmedabad describe how the city authorities have considerably increased local revenue bases which then permits more investment both in supporting economic development and in improving basic service provision.

d. ‘Pro-poor’ orientations within economic policies

This has at least two dimensions. The first is
direct support for expanding employment or increased incomes for poorer groups – for instance through labour-based public employment/works and support for community-based initiatives, as in the AGETIPE example described in the paper on Bamako. The second is the scope given for low-income groups to develop or pursue their own livelihoods – through the nature of support for small-scale enterprises, and the controls on their operation, including the extent to which local authorities allow hawkers and small scale traders to operate. City governments may have little capacity to increase income levels for low-income groups (since these are influenced by so many factors beyond their control) but they can do much to harm the livelihoods of lower income groups. The papers reveal the different levels of “anti-poor” attitudes and policies – for instance from those that seek at least to provide some accommodation for hawkers and informal markets (as in Cebu and Johannesburg) to those that actively repress them (as in Kumasi).

The paper on Visakhapatnam emphasizes the importance of the upgrading programme there not only for improving housing conditions but also for improving business by reducing flooding, making roads more passable, increasing the length of the day (through street lighting) and increasing the use of outside space. A fifth of the households interviewed reported that economic circumstances had improved with the upgrading.

f. Local political systems which poor and disadvantaged groups can influence

The extent to which poor groups can influence urban government structures obviously influences the extent and nature of “pro-poor” policies and activities in the areas mentioned above. Case studies in previous issues of *Environment and Urbanization* have included some interesting examples of more responsive urban governments – for instance the healthy cities programme of the city of Leon in Nicaragua, the environment and development programmes in Ilo, Peru and Manizales, Colombia and the participatory budgeting in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. The papers in this issue provide some interesting contrasts, from those where the urban poor have very little influence, to those where their influence is more evident. For instance, in Cebu, although city government restricts the influence of people’s organizations and NGOs in determining policies and influencing resource use, it does support a wide range of social programmes implemented by such groups. It has also been more tolerant of informal enterprises and illegal settlements than most city authorities – and the paper describes the mechanisms by which people’s organizations and NGOs influence who gets elected and what they do.

The paper on Colombo by Steven Russell and Elizabeth Vidler describes the period when the Sri Lankan government’s Million-Houses Programme allowed low-income groups a much greater role in improving infrastructure and services – through community development councils and community action planning. It draws on interviews and group discussions with the residents in eight neighbourhoods which provide some insights into why it worked better – for instance those interviewed reported that the government staff listened and provided funds without bribes or political influence. But the interviewees also point to the more negative aspects – for instance the fact that they saw local and international NGOs being primary beneficiaries, and the fact that local politicians felt threatened by the direct support to community level. The paper also describes the difficulty in sustaining the new more participatory models in the face of widespread poverty, entrenched government institutions and power structures that were antagonistic to community participation.

City authorities can clearly achieve far more in meeting their legal responsibilities if they work cooperatively with community-based organiza-
tions. To be effective, local governments need to establish formal lines of communication with community efforts and to support existing initiatives – as well as developing accountable and transparent mechanisms for providing support. Local governments have to be more honest about the constraints they face in reaching the poor at the scale that is required. It is relatively easy for local government to support the existing efforts of NGOs and the larger scale community organizations but it is much more difficult to put in place a process that allows most or all informal settlements to benefit from improved opportunities. Local governments also have to be more willing to address the potential conflict between participatory democracy and state control of development resources. For example, a participatory local process changes the nature of investments in basic infrastructure and services and, as the paper on Colombo highlights, the vested interests of both state officials and elected politicians may be threatened.

III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO HIGHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT

THE PAPERS IN this issue make clear the influence of links with higher levels of government on local governments’ capacity. Two aspects need emphasizing. The first is the extent to which higher levels of government (at national or state/provincial level) ensure that urban government structures are representative of and accountable to their citizens. The second is the extent to which higher levels of government permit urban governments the power and resources to fulfill their responsibilities.

Most nations have undergone some form of decentralization over the last fifteen years that has affected urban governments – and in the case of Cebu and Ahmedabad, this has given the city authorities more scope for development. But in many nations, decentralization has not been accompanied by increased local democracy or by more effective municipal governments. As the paper by Nick Devas and David Korboe describes, for instance, there is little evidence that decentralization in Ghana has helped produce a more effective, accountable local government for Kumasi; the central government-appointed chief executive of Kumasi has kept power, and there are very few resources available to the sub-metropolitan assemblies, town councils and unit committees which can ensure more effective local responses to poverty reduction. Several of the papers in this issue emphasize how much power and control over resources is retained by higher levels of government, despite very different political structures – for instance in Maputo, Bangalore, Santiago and Mombasa. The paper by Eduardo Dockem dorff, Alfredo Rodriguez and Lucy Winchester on Santiago indicates that it is mostly national institutions that determine Santiago’s development – by (among other things) designing and building the highway network and the urban road system, deciding on the location of social housing, regulating transportation and determining environmental conditions.

One common reason why this happens is to keep power and resources in the hands of the party in power at national or state level. The three papers on major Indian cities provide some interesting contrasts. Shyam Dutta’s paper outlines, the Indian government has provided more support for democratic decentralization and has transferred the main responsibility for poverty alleviation to municipal authorities. In Ahmedabad, the municipal authorities have been able to capitalize on this, with considerable increases in revenue generation and capital investment drawn from its own revenues. Solomon Benjamin’s paper on Bangalore tells a different story; power and access to public resources have been taken away from the elected local government and concentrated in state level institutions and national agencies in which there is little or no representation. In Visakhapatnam, Philip Amis and Shashi Kumar point out how investment in infrastructure has lagged behind the rapid expansion of the city’s economy and population, and key decisions regarding infrastructure investment are not made at city level but at state or national level.

Nor should it be assumed that the introduction of elected municipal authorities and mayors necessarily ensures more effective municipal governments – as discussed in the case of Mombasa, where higher levels of government inhibit the development of effective urban government. In many nations, despite decentralization, the political, financial and technical capacity to define initiatives and to start new developments and programmes remain with politicians, ministries or agencies at higher levels of government. The papers on Visakhapatnam and Bangalore highlight the complexity of the
relations between city government and higher levels of government, both in terms of the control exercised by national or state level party politics on what is done or not done at city level, and in terms of funding for infrastructure.

IV. BALANCING ECONOMIC SUCCESS WITH PRO-POOR ORIENTATIONS

ONE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY facing all city governments is how best to balance support for new national and international investment with support that brings more direct benefits for low-income groups. The paper on Cebu shows that rapid, sustained economic growth does not necessarily translate into increased incomes for most of the city’s population. The paper on Bangalore demonstrates that a city government’s focus on economic growth can even bring increased impoverishment for many groups, as their settlements and workplaces are cleared to make way for infrastructure and residential developments that bring them little or no benefit.

International businesses are adept at making city and national authorities compete for their investments and in so doing, getting very large concessions. The possibility of a Microsoft or a Ford factory stimulates much public sector effort in ensuring that the land and the high quality infrastructure and services are available for these factories – even while half the city’s population has no access to land for their homes with infrastructure and services. Many financial concessions will also be promised – which then diminish the likely benefits, especially for local authorities. Yet within a world economy where so much production is mobile, local authorities need to enhance the competitiveness of their cities in attracting new investment. The paper on Bangalore highlights the need for more attention to the governance processes through which different groups compete for public investments and support. Urban governments pay too little attention to supporting their local economies, and this tendency is reinforced within undemocratic or unrepresentative government structures. Limited public resources are often better used to support the expansion or start-up of local enterprises than to try to meet the demands of international investment, especially where international investment brings few likely multiplier linkages for the city’s economy.

The paper on Johannesburg also shows how the need for organizational change (in this case away from old apartheid models of local government) and for good fiscal performance (to help attract new investment) have distracted attention and resources away from poverty reduction. It is also a reminder of the difficulty in changing institutional structures. This city is the economic heartland of South Africa. With the end of apartheid it was transformed from a city run by a white minority for a white minority (where black South Africans were not recognized as citizens) to a democratic government. But as the paper by Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw and Susan Parnell discusses, it is difficult to change large and complex institutional structures so they can actually deliver on the pro-poor stance of many elected councillors and government officials. The authorities in Johannesburg also have to ensure their city is competitive globally, yet a stress only on being a successful high technology city, as in Bangalore, can divert attention and resources away from supporting the local economies through which most citizens make a living.

V. WHERE THERE IS NO PRO-POOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT

SOME OF THE papers are reminders of how little local governments do to reduce poverty. Many local governments regard the poor and their neighbourhoods as “the problem”, and there is little connection between the policies and priorities within government structures and the daily lives and most pressing needs of most of the population. Mayors or powerful officials often reveal their anti-poor sentiments – for instance in their negative views on migrants in general, or hawkers, or informal settlements. Or they see democratic checks and balances as hindering a city’s competitiveness. As Solomon Benjamin’s paper tells, many shopkeepers and squatters now realize that “they are the dirt” to be cleaned off to fulfill the chief minister’s goal to change Bangalore into a “Singapore.” The chief executive of Kumasi seems to have comparable ideas.

The papers on the three Indian cities and on Maputo, Kumasi and Mombasa also highlight the political and institutional constraints on the development of more pro-poor urban governments. These constraints include the complex political struggles between national and local government, the overlapping responsibilities between different
VI. CONCLUSIONS

THE PAPERS IN this issue make clear the very considerable scope that all local governments have to reduce poverty – both in what they do and what they do not do. They point to the many ways in which local government institutions, policies and actions can contribute to reducing one or more of the multiple deprivations that are suffered by most of those with low incomes. They highlight the areas where these contributions are concentrated – access to land for housing, infrastructure and services, and within political and legal systems which protect civil and political rights and allow low-income households scope for developing their livelihoods and influencing public policies. They also highlight the limitations – for instance the very limited capacity to increase low-income groups’ incomes directly – although they do have important roles in making their city attractive to new investment and in avoiding policies that destroy livelihood opportunities for low-income groups.

The papers point to the importance of local authorities developing the capacity to understand the needs and priorities of their lower-income citizens – and also the different needs of different groups, for instance by location, age and gender. Some of the most interesting insights in this issue come from papers that draw on a direct consultation with low-income groups – for instance from community activists in Colombo, from different people living in El Mezquital and from those involved in the participatory assessment of upgrading in Visakhapatnam. The paper on Visakhapatnam emphasizes the value of such consultation by showing the range of deprivations that poorer groups emphasize when consulted, and the different groups (with different priorities) that exist among “the poor”. All the papers in this issue also emphasize the complex political economy within each city which influences who gets land, infrastructure and services – and the obvious (but often forgotten) point that unless political systems allow poorer groups to have influence, there is little likelihood of effective poverty reduction.

Some points are especially relevant to the growing number of international donors that are developing urban policies. They include:

• The need to develop channels that can provide support direct to community-based initiatives, especially where local governments are indifferent; the case study of El Mezquital in particular shows how modest support from external agencies can help improve conditions, although it also shows the limitations of such support in being able to address the very limited income-earning opportunities available to its inhabitants;
• The need for long-term support for city authorities within political systems that allow them to be accountable to and responsive to low-income groups – but with a recognition that this can be a long process, especially where city authorities remain weak; and
• The danger of external agencies promoting unrealistic “urban management” agendas that are in conflict with local capacities and power structures (which is highlighted by Paul Jenkins’ paper on Maputo).

VII. FEEDBACK

TWO PAPERS ARE included in the Feedback section. The first is one that has particular relevance to low-income groups’ livelihoods – the paper by Peter Kellett and Graham Tipple on how in many parts of the world, the dwelling is also a place of production and income-generation ranging from small-scale, part-time tasks to manufacturing activities which may dominate the home environment. The second by Hilda Herzer, María Mercedes Di Virgilio, Máximo Lanzetta, María Carla Rodríguez and Adriana Redondo contrasts the different kinds of community organization that develop in the two forms of settlement that
are most commonly used by low-income groups in Buenos Aires – the invasion of vacant land, mostly in peripheral areas, and the occupation of vacant buildings within the city centre.

VIII. ORDERING PAPERS FROM ENVIRONMENT AND URBANIZATION ELECTRONICALLY

ON AN EXPERIMENTAL basis, we are offering up to three papers from issues of Environment and Urbanization to be sent electronically as .pdf files for UK£5 or US$8 paid for, in advance, by Mastercard, Visa, Delta or Switch credit cards. Readers may choose any three papers from Vol 9, No 2 to the present; details about the papers in recent issues are available on our web-site: www.iied.org/eandu. Those ordering the papers can send credit card details by e-mail, post or fax (our address and numbers are on the back cover).

NOTES AND REFERENCES


3. For more details, see Hardoy, Jorge E, Diana Mitlin and David Satterthwaite (2000), Environmental Problems in Cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Earthscan Publications, London. This is an updated and much expanded edition of these authors’ 1992 Earthscan book on Environmental Problems in Third World Cities.


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